EU Power Shifts, Veto Reform Stalls

When EU foreign ministers gathered at Druids Glen in Wicklow on 1-2 September for the twice-yearly Gymnich, the EU's informal foreign-policy meeting where ministers speak freely but take no binding decisions, two reform ideas were on the table (EEAS, The Journal). Both are sold as ways to make Europe quicker and more coherent abroad. Only one has a real route forward. The other runs straight into the national veto it is meant to soften.

Kallas has the title but not the tools

Kaja Kallas, the EU's High Representative for foreign affairs, carries the title that suggests command. The reality is messier. The money and staff behind development aid, defence industry policy, humanitarian relief and neighbourhood policy sit in separate Commission departments that she does not control (Le Monde, Euronews).

France and Germany want to change that. Their July ministerial-council conclusions called for reform of the EU's external-action structures, with the October European Council, where leaders set the bloc's direction, pencilled in as the moment to begin formal work (Elysée, Bundesregierung). The reported model would bring more of those instruments within Kallas's reach. It would also place her more firmly inside Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's chain of command (Politico).

That matters for Malta as much as for the larger capitals. A small state depends on formal channels because informal weight is limited. When power moves from the Council table, where Malta has a seat and a vote, towards the Berlaymont hierarchy, access becomes more dependent on Commission priorities and personal networks.

The EU's diplomatic service, the EEAS, is itself a hybrid: part national foreign services, part Commission, part Council secretariat. Under the reported Franco-German thinking, it would focus more on strategy and military missions, and less on budgets and programmes. In practice, the EEAS could lose influence over money, staff postings and agenda-setting, even if its chief gains more policy instruments (EUPerspectives). No public Franco-German paper has been released. The outline is still based on leaks, consistently reported but not confirmed in detail.

This is the reform that can move fastest because it does not require treaty change. It would mean revising the 2010 Council decision that created the EEAS (Council Decision 2010/427/EU).

The veto problem stays locked

The second track goes to the harder question: the national veto. A non-paper from 11 countries, including France, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden, proposes a code of conduct against obstructive vetoes in foreign policy (ANSA, Euronews). Under the treaties, foreign and security policy still requires unanimity. One government can block sanctions or crisis action even when the other 26 agree (Article 31 TEU).

The paper pushes governments towards constructive abstention, the mechanism that lets a member state stand aside without stopping the decision. It also asks capitals not to use foreign-policy files as leverage for unrelated demands. Longer term, it calls for exploring qualified majority voting, where decisions pass by a weighted majority rather than by consensus. There is precedent: Cyprus, Ireland, Austria and Malta have each stepped aside on specific files instead of using the veto (Euronews).

The catch is basic EU mechanics. The escape route also needs unanimity. The countries protected by the veto would have to agree to weaken it. That leaves the code of conduct closer to political pressure than binding reform.

Who pays

The two reform tracks create different winners and losers. Reorganising the machinery would strengthen the Commission presidency as the command point for foreign policy. For smaller states, including Malta, the issue is not constitutional theory. It is whether national capitals keep a reliable Council route into decisions that can affect sanctions, migration deals, energy security and neighbourhood policy.

Estonia shows the contradiction clearly. Tallinn wants faster sanctions coordination and has publicly said Hungary and Slovakia slowed key Ukraine decisions (Estonian Government). But speed through the Commission hierarchy carries a cost if it narrows the Council channel where small states can put their case directly (ERR).

The veto debate hurts a different set of players. Cyprus treats the veto as insurance on EU-Turkey files; weakening it would remove one of a small country's strongest diplomatic levers (RIK, Kathimerini). Hungary has used the same veto to delay sanctions packages. For both, the present system is not an inconvenience. It is protection.

Wicklow produced no decisions, as a Gymnich is not meant to (Irish Times). The October European Council is the next real test. The reform most likely to move is the one that changes the chain of command, because it needs a Council decision rather than a treaty change. Brussels may get a cleaner org chart long before it gets a quicker way to decide.