Russia’s Oreshnik Leaves Europe Exposed

Russia fired its nuclear-capable Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile at Kyiv on 24 May, during the largest aerial assault of the war so far: around 600 drones and 90 missiles in one night. At least four people were killed and more than 100 wounded. The targets included Ukraine's Foreign Ministry, the German ARD broadcasting studio, and the Albanian ambassador's residence (Kyiv Independent, Deutschlandfunk). No air defence system now deployed in Ukraine, or anywhere else in Europe, can reliably stop the weapon.

Poland's Operational Command scrambled fighter jets for more than three hours as a preventive NATO defence measure after the missile's trajectory pointed towards its eastern border (Euronews PL). That was not diplomatic theatre. It was a military activation inside NATO territory, triggered by a weapon moving too fast for ground-based interceptors to catch.

Why Nothing in Europe's Arsenal Can Stop It

The Oreshnik is an IRBM, a missile class with a range of 3,000 to 5,500 km, designed to carry nuclear warheads. Its warheads re-enter the atmosphere at Mach 10, then split into several independently targeted submunitions. At that speed, ionised plasma forms around each warhead, blinding the fire-control radars that guide interceptors towards their targets (ifrankivchanyn.com).

Germany's nine IRIS-T systems can deal with cruise missiles, but not with a ballistic threat of this kind (Defence Ukraine). Patriot systems also fail at these speeds. Arrow-3, the only European system built for this missile class, will not reach full capability before 2030 (JNS).

The Franco-Italian SAMP/T NG, a next-generation surface-to-air system, is expected to be combat-tested in Ukraine this year against Russian ballistic missiles (Army Recognition). Whether it can handle Oreshnik submunitions is still unproven.

Putin has said that "several such missiles, even with conventional warheads, could be as devastating as a nuclear strike." The missile can carry conventional payloads, but it was designed for nuclear ones. Every launch keeps that ambiguity in play. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas called the deployment "reckless nuclear brinkmanship" (Ukrainska Pravda).

Rhetoric Moves, Hardware Doesn't

The timing was deliberate. Two days before the strike, US Secretary of State Rubio declared American-brokered peace talks dead (EA World View). Days earlier, Russia had completed nuclear exercises involving 64,000 personnel, rehearsing Oreshnik deployment and nuclear warhead handling in Belarus (Army Recognition).

Chancellor Merz condemned the "reckless escalation", but announced no new military commitments (Spiegel). Germany leads the European Sky Shield Initiative, a 23-country air defence procurement framework. Its only layer capable of dealing with an IRBM is Arrow-3, still four years away.

France is building a competing system outside that framework, backed by eight partner states under Macron's European nuclear deterrence umbrella (Le Grand Continent). Poland, whose jets were just sent up to defend its own airspace, is in neither programme.

Hungary's Foreign Minister Orbán Anita called the attack "brutal" and "unacceptable" (Telex). Budapest also signalled it was ready to lift its long-running block on sanctioning Russian Patriarch Kirill (Euronews). But Hungary still refuses to send weapons or sign NATO eastern-flank declarations. The language shifted. The policy did not.

Bulgaria said nothing. A €3 billion arbitration threat from the Swiss holding company that owns Bulgaria's Lukoil refinery is keeping Premier Radev's government silent. Bulgaria remains one of four EU states refusing to back a war crimes tribunal against Putin (DW, Debati.bg).

Estonia, which is spending 5% of GDP on defence, gave the clearest reading of the politics behind the attack. Foreign Minister Tsahkna warned that Moscow was trying to pull Europe into "premature peace talks" designed to ease sanctions pressure, not end the war (ERR). The three Baltic presidents demanded that NATO replace rotating air patrols with a permanent air defence mission (President.ee).

EU foreign ministers meet this week. For Malta, a neutral EU state outside NATO but inside every sanctions debate, this is where the issue lands: Europe can condemn the strike, tighten sanctions, and argue about procurement frameworks. But Poland had to scramble jets against a weapon it could not shoot down, while the continent's first real interceptor layer is not due before 2030. That gap will shape every conversation in the room.