Five Taliban Visas for EU Return Talks

Brussels is trying to make Afghan returns work without recognising the Taliban government. That is the bargain exposed by NOS reporting that Belgium issued one-day visas to five Taliban representatives expected for Commission talks on rejected Afghan asylum seekers. No public Belgian or EU record confirms that detail. But the practical problem is clear enough: returns need documents, airport access and acceptance on arrival. In Afghanistan, those levers now sit with the Taliban.

The Visa Door

The EU has permitted contact with Taliban officials without recognition since the Council set out its Afghanistan line in 2021. On paper, that distinction is neat. In migration policy, it becomes much messier. A return flight cannot operate on legal formulae alone; someone in Kabul must receive the person being sent back.

If the NOS account is accurate, Belgium’s role would be limited but politically exposed. Under the EU Visa Code, Belgium decides who enters its territory for this kind of short stay. Article 25 allows a visa valid only for limited territory in exceptional cases.

That would still not close the matter. If any delegate appears on the UN Taliban sanctions list, Belgium would also have to fit the trip through the UN’s travel-ban exemption process. A one-day visa would not, by itself, be enough.

Talks Are Not A Deal

The Commission can open a channel. It cannot, on its own, bind the EU to a readmission deal with the Taliban. EU law gives the bloc room to negotiate return arrangements, but formal international agreements still have to pass through the treaty process, including Article 79(3) and Article 218.

That map of power matters for Malta too, because return policy is where EU migration politics often meets domestic pressure. Governments want to show that failed asylum cases can end in removal. Germany shows the limit. Berlin deported 28 Afghan men to Kabul in August 2024, described as convicted offenders, on a flight reportedly arranged through Qatar (PBS/AP, Al Jazeera). Reuters later reported German interest in direct talks with the Taliban.

So far, the pattern is narrow, mediated and legally exposed. Governments can promise firmer returns. Making them happen requires a counterpart they do not want to legitimise.

Austria has also argued for keeping Afghan return options open, including in the 2021 push reported by Reuters. Denmark’s EU presidency programme puts returns and cooperation with non-EU countries high on its published priorities. Belgium, as host state, would carry the immediate scrutiny over visas, sanctions and whether contact starts to look too much like recognition.

The Rights Limit

No meeting in Brussels changes the legal ban on sending someone into serious harm. The EU Return Directive requires respect for non-refoulement, the rule that people cannot be returned to danger. The Charter bars removals where there is a serious risk of torture or inhuman treatment.

Courts can still stop removals case by case. The European Court of Human Rights made that protection absolute under Article 3 in Saadi v Italy. Current EUAA guidance on Afghanistan still identifies groups facing serious risk, while Amnesty and Human Rights Watch describe severe Taliban repression, especially against women and girls.

Contact is not recognition. The harder questions are more specific: who entered Belgium, under what visa and sanctions basis, and whether any understanding on returns was being sought. Europe’s return policy is running into Taliban control, and the most sensitive part may be happening away from public view.