Germany enters French nuclear drills

Two governments that could not settle who should sit in the cockpit of Europe’s next-generation fighter now want to coordinate the military systems around France’s nuclear deterrent. On 17 July, Emmanuel Macron and Friedrich Merz announced a Franco-German Nuclear Steering Group, confidential deterrence consultations, and German conventional participation in a French nuclear exercise (Elysée, Al Jazeera). For Malta, which lives inside the EU’s security debates but outside NATO’s command structure, the distinction matters. This is being sold as European strategic autonomy. In practice, it is a much narrower move, and that is where its meaning lies.

What Germany Actually Gets

Germany is not getting French warheads, custody over them, launch authority, or an automatic French nuclear guarantee. France’s deterrent remains national. What Berlin is being invited into is the conventional military layer that protects and supports French nuclear operations: escort fighters, air defence, early warning, radar and deep-strike integration around temporary Rafale deployments (Telegraph, Boursorama/AFP). Merz himself conceded that the precise shape of German participation still has to be clarified (Moneycontrol/AFP).

That line is not technical pedantry. Germany already takes part in NATO nuclear sharing, the US-led arrangement under which American nuclear weapons are stationed in Europe and allied aircraft train to deliver them, while Washington keeps the final release authority (Cambridge University Press). The French track adds another consultation and support layer. It does not replace the American one.

Patching Over Industrial Failure

The timing is doing a lot of work. The FCAS/SCAF fighter programme, Europe’s flagship attempt to build a sixth-generation warplane jointly, is in serious doubt after Dassault and Airbus failed to resolve their leadership dispute earlier this year (DW). When Paris and Berlin cannot show industrial unity, they reach for strategic symbolism. The nuclear steering group helps Macron reopen his argument that France’s nuclear deterrent should be discussed with European allies, while keeping control in Paris. It gives Merz a way to look active on European defence without stepping outside NATO’s frame.

The Elysée did list concrete military work: conventional forces, precision strike and missile defence (Elysée). That gives the steering group a practical agenda beyond the usual communiqué language. The test is whether it produces repeated exercises and integrated planning, or whether it remains another Franco-German mechanism whose main product is political cover.

Eastern Europe Ranks, Not Rejects

The countries closest to Russia are not dismissing the French track. They are putting it in order.

Poland has opened its own nuclear cooperation steering group with France, and Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski has described a future in which the US acts as "cavalry over the hill" rather than permanent infantry on the ground (Bankier/PAP). Preliminary talks on permanent French weapons stocks in Poland point in the same direction: Warsaw sees French deterrence dialogue as useful insurance, not as a substitute for NATO (Rzeczpospolita).

Lithuania wants every available layer, but in a clear hierarchy: NATO and US guarantees first, air and missile defence second, French dialogue only if it strengthens the chain from warning to decision to deployed forces (tv3.lt, vz.lt). The pattern across Europe is plain enough. No frontline government rejects French involvement, but none treats it as a replacement for American power. For Poland and the Baltics, deterrence depends on who authorises action, which forces act, and how quickly they arrive. A declaration from Cologne does not answer that.

The Franco-German nuclear steering group is a political channel with some military work attached. It repairs the optics after FCAS stalled. It gives eastern-flank allies another place to talk. It does not create a European deterrence architecture, and no government outside Paris is pretending otherwise. The credibility test now sits with Merz and Macron: whether the exercise becomes routine, whether command relationships are clarified, and whether conventional forces actually deploy. Until then, France and Germany have issued a promise on the letterhead of a partnership that has just failed to deliver a fighter jet.