Greek gas exports triple

Greek gas exports to Southeast Europe tripled in the first half of 2026, reaching 8.72 TWh from 2.86 TWh a year earlier, according to DESFA, Greece's gas transmission operator (Reporter/DESFA). In May, Greece also sent 874.2 GWh of net electricity into neighbouring grids, with two-thirds flowing to Bulgaria (Serbia Energy).

For Malta, an island that still treats energy security as a practical question rather than a slogan, the Greek story is familiar: infrastructure matters only when somebody is ready to book it, pay for it, and keep using it when prices move. The volumes are there. The harder question is whether companies will commit to these routes for years, not weeks.

How the gas moves

Greece now has two terminals bringing in LNG, the liquefied natural gas cooled for transport by tanker. Revithoussa, near Athens, remains the main workhorse. It handled 18.61 TWh in the first half of 2026, covering 43% of Greek gas imports. Alexandroupolis, a newer floating unit in the northeast, is growing from a smaller base, processing 3.46 TWh, more than triple its level a year earlier (Reporter/DESFA).

Once the LNG is converted back into gas, it enters DESFA's pipeline network and can cross into Bulgaria at Sidirokastro, the main border metering point. From there, operators can move it north through Romania towards Moldova and Ukraine. That south-to-north chain is what energy officials call the Vertical Corridor.

The electricity story is more fragile. Greece exported cheaply in May because renewables, at 57% of generation, and hydro, at 8%, pushed the day-ahead price below neighbours' costs. The day-ahead price is the wholesale rate agreed for delivery the next day (Serbia Energy). A summer heatwave can lift air-conditioning demand, pull gas-fired plants back into price-setting, and reverse the flow within weeks.

Gas pipeline contracts are harder to unwind. That is where the real test sits.

Who is booking capacity, and who isn't

The clearest commercial signal comes from Sidirokastro. In long-term auctions, 46% of available export capacity was booked for gas years 2026/27 through 2029/30. Metlen reserved 20 GWh/day and Atlantic SEE LNG Trade took 13 GWh/day (News247). Booking capacity costs money, so it says more than a ministerial statement or a Brussels press line.

The commitment is not even across the system. No bidder showed interest in Route 3 via Nea Mesimvria, a TAP-linked entry point, in the same auctions (Protothema English). Some corridors exist on maps before they exist in the market.

Further north, Moldova's state trader Energocom reserved winter 2026-2027 capacity at the Ungheni border point, with about 41% of Romanian exit capacity and 39% of Moldovan entry capacity taken (Moldova1). Romanian operators are discussing tariff adjustments for the corridor with Brussels (Știripesurse).

Hungary is still the missing link. Public Hungarian sources treat the Greek route as a technical option, not yet as a working supply channel. The argument there remains centred on MOL's Russian oil imports through the Druzhba pipeline and the Adriatic alternative (Telex/G7, HVG).

Who gains, who pays

Greek terminal operators, traders and power producers gain from higher throughput and export revenue. DESFA earns transmission fees on every cubic metre moving through its network. Neighbouring governments gain bargaining power against existing suppliers. Croatia, which is expanding its Krk LNG terminal to 6.1 bcm/year, is riding the same diversification wave rather than losing out to Greece (Poslovni).

The uncertainty falls on buyers. More routes improve security of supply, but gas moving from south to north picks up costs at every stage: regasification fees, transmission tariffs, transit charges, and the balancing fees networks use to keep supply and demand aligned. Malta knows this arithmetic well from its own dependence on imported energy and interconnectors. The route may be politically useful and still be commercially painful.

If Greek-routed gas is safer but more expensive after every border fee is counted, households and factories in Bulgaria, Romania or Moldova are paying a diversification premium. Whether that premium is worth paying depends on the competition. Russian gas has not disappeared from the market: EU imports of Russian pipeline gas rose 7% year on year and Russian LNG rose 11% in the first five months of 2026, according to ACER data (Euro2day, ACER).

Greece has proved that the route can work. It has not yet proved that it can set the terms. That difference will be measured in sustained flows at prices that still beat the alternatives once every border fee is counted. That test is only starting.