Magyar Removes Sulyok In 139-6 Vote

Hungary's parliament voted 139 to 6 on Sunday to amend the constitution, remove the sitting president and redraw parts of the court system (Le Figaro, Reuters). Viktor Orbán's Fidesz boycotted the sitting. Prime Minister Péter Magyar is taking apart the machinery Orbán built over 14 years, but he is doing it with the same instrument Orbán used so effectively: a governing supermajority rewriting the constitution to decide who keeps power. Brussels now faces an uncomfortable test. Do rule-of-law standards apply with the same force when the government stretching them is pro-European?

What the amendment dismantles

The package is aimed at the people and structures Orbán left behind. A transitional clause ends the mandate of President Tamás Sulyok, an Orbán-era appointee, and gives him five days to sign the text before the removal process starts (Reuters). A new 70-year age limit for Constitutional Court judges removes four sitting members, including the court's president (Euronews, CMS). That court can either block or validate the new government's programme. Its composition is therefore not a technical matter. It is where the struggle over the state is being fought.

The amendment also restores the court's power to review budget laws, a check Orbán had removed, and creates a constitutionally protected asset-recovery office to trace misused public and EU funds (CEAC Law, Frankfurter Rundschau).

Repair or reverse capture

There is a serious argument for acting. Orbán placed loyalists in the presidency, the courts and state television, while weakening the checks that could have restrained them. If that network were left untouched, a defeated political system could continue to exercise real power over the new government (CER).

But the contrary argument is just as serious. A constitutional rule written for one named president is not a neutral rule. It is a weapon aimed at one office-holder. A retroactive age limit that removes identifiable judges looks very close to the court-packing that EU rule-of-law standards were designed to prevent (CMS). Le Monde called Magyar pro-European but described the procedure as "contested." Le Figaro warned that restoring the rule of law cannot mean abandoning legal safeguards (Le Monde, Le Figaro).

For Maltese readers, this is not an abstract European law seminar. We know what happens when institutions are captured, and we also know why shortcuts taken in the name of repair can become precedents for the next government. The mechanism matters because tomorrow's abuse usually borrows yesterday's exception.

Sulyok challenged the amendment before the vote. He asked the Venice Commission, the Council of Europe's constitutional-law advisory body, to assess whether a clause drafted to end his mandate meets rule-of-law principles. Its opinions are not binding, but they carry weight across Europe (Budapest Times). The Commission will not take up his case until October (Telex). Magyar's majority voted in July. A government that waits for outside scrutiny shows it is open to correction. A government that moves first shows that speed has priority.

Brussels's consistency test

Three days before the vote, the Commission confirmed that Hungary would join EPPO, the European Public Prosecutor's Office, which investigates crimes against the EU budget. Budapest had previously kept those cases away from outside scrutiny. EU finance ministers also approved a revised recovery plan that could unlock roughly €10 billion linked to anti-corruption milestones (Euronews, Telex).

Joining EPPO is a strong signal. But signals are not prosecutions. The asset-recovery office now has constitutional status, yet its powers, independence and judicial oversight depend on implementing laws that have not been written. The Commission can still withhold payments if milestones are not met (CER). Whether it will do so is the real question.

When Orbán was in power, Brussels used rule-of-law conditions as leverage against a hostile government. Magyar is an ally. He inherited captured institutions, and dismantling them is legitimate work. But the method cannot be treated as a detail. Pro-European intent is not a substitute for enforceable rule-of-law repair.