Lithuania blocks Belarus potash route

The United States asked Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine to let Belarusian potash move through their territory again. All three refused. The request came in May 2026 through an unsigned State Department "nonpaper", an informal policy document with no official attribution.

The row matters beyond fertiliser. Washington has already lifted its own restrictions on Belaruskali, Belarus's state potash monopoly. The EU cannot do the same unless all 27 member states agree. For small member states, including Malta, that distinction is the whole point of EU sanctions law: once the bloc acts, no capital can quietly make its own exception.

Why No Single Country Can Say Yes

EU sanctions on Belarusian potash are built into Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2006, a law that applies directly to customs authorities, railway operators and port terminals across the Union (finance.ec.europa.eu). It bans imports, transit and transport of Belarusian potassium chloride inside EU territory (gov.ie).

Lithuania's foreign minister Kęstutis Budrys put the position bluntly: as long as EU sanctions remain in force, "such activities cannot be carried out in Lithuania, Latvia or Poland" (LRT).

The sanctions were adopted unanimously in the Council of the EU, where every member state must agree. Removing them requires the same procedure. In February 2026, the EU unanimously renewed Belarus sanctions until February 2027 and kept the potash restrictions in place (Mayer Brown).

The American nonpaper therefore asks three countries to do something EU law does not allow them to do on their own. Lithuanian President Nausėda said it plainly: "We could not change anything even if we wanted to."

Prisoners for Potash

Washington's case is transactional. Since January 2025, Trump envoy John Coale has visited Minsk repeatedly and secured more than 500 political prisoner releases, including Nobel laureate Ales Bialiatski and opposition leader Maria Kolesnikova, in exchange for staged US sanctions relief (Euronews, RFE/RL). By March 2026, Washington had fully removed Belaruskali from its sanctions list.

The nonpaper then suggested that European transit revenues could help fund Ukraine's defence. It is a clever frame, because it makes refusal look like a lack of solidarity with Kyiv rather than a defence of EU sanctions discipline.

The other argument is strategic: ease pressure on Minsk and Belarus may drift away from Moscow. The military record points the other way. Russia deployed its nuclear-capable Oreshnik missile system to Belarus in December 2025, the same week as the potash deal (Arms Control Association).

Ukraine's foreign minister Andriy Sybiha rejected the premise: "There should be no illusions that someone, through some kind of concessions, will be able to pull Belarus out of Russia's sphere of influence" (Interfax Ukraine).

The Price of Saying No

Lithuania is not taking this position for free. Belarusian potash once accounted for nearly a third of Klaipėda port's cargo volume. The loss cost around €14 million annually in port revenue, while the terminal handling those shipments saw income fall from €96 million to €3.2 million (Lrytas).

Poland has kept quiet. Warsaw has neither confirmed nor denied receiving the nonpaper. Its rail gauge incompatibility with Belarus also gives it a practical obstacle, on top of the legal one (Rzeczpospolita).

The EU, meanwhile, has moved in the opposite direction. Its 20th sanctions package, adopted in April 2026, added new designations against Belarusian entities and raised tariffs on Belarusian potash entering the bloc (Mayer Brown).

Ukrainian presidential adviser Dmytro Lytvyn named the wider risk: "It gives Putin confidence that sanctions can be eased" (RBC-Ukraine).

That is the precedent Brussels fears. If a major EU sectoral sanction can be loosened through bilateral American pressure on individual capitals, the same method can be tried later on Russian energy and financial restrictions. Malta knows this terrain from another angle: EU sanctions are only as credible as the weakest enforcement point in the single market.

The next test comes in February 2027, when Belarus sanctions are due for their annual unanimous renewal. Any single member state can block an extension. Hungary has used that leverage before on Russia packages, although under its new government led by Péter Magyar, Budapest has moved closer to the EU mainstream.

On a separate track, Lukashenko has floated a $3 billion mine sale to US investors (Euromaidan Press). If American companies buy into Belarusian potash production, Washington's quiet request becomes harder to read as pure diplomacy.