Pentagon cuts 5,000 troops in Germany

NATO's top commander in Europe, General Alexus Grynkewich, told reporters in Brussels on May 19 that he was "very comfortable" with pulling 5,000 US troops out of Germany and cancelling a brigade rotation to Poland. Hours later, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas told the European Parliament that the move "was to be expected", while insisting NATO deterrence remains "intact."

For Malta, outside NATO but inside the EU room where defence money and security policy are now being argued over, the point is not the number alone. It is that Washington's retreat from Europe is being folded into the official assumptions of European security planning.

Withdrawal as Doctrine

Grynkewich presented the drawdown as a sign that Europe has to carry more of its own weight. "As allies build up their capability, the United States is able to pull capability back and use it for other global priorities," he said, calling the process "NATO 3.0".

He also said "additional redeployments should absolutely be expected" in the coming years. That matters because it turns American troop reductions from a temporary Washington decision into something closer to NATO doctrine.

Vice President Vance used softer language on the same day. He said the Poland deployment had been "delayed, not cancelled", while admitting Washington had "not made the final determination" on where those troops would go.

The military side is planning for a sustained pullback. The political side is keeping room for manoeuvre. Those two positions cannot both remain vague for long.

Three Strategies, No Common Plan

Europe's answer is already splitting into three approaches.

Eastern states are competing for a shrinking American presence. Poland, Romania and the Baltic states want departing US troops moved eastwards rather than sent home. They are offering Washington better basing terms and close political alignment.

In Warsaw, the drawdown has become domestic ammunition. Opposition PiS leader Kaczyński accuses Prime Minister Tusk of "destroying the relationship with the US in two years". Tusk says the opposition is blaming Poland for decisions being taken in Washington.

France is building a parallel security architecture around its nuclear arsenal. The French National Assembly approved €36 billion in additional military spending on May 19.

Macron's "advanced deterrence" doctrine brings eight partner countries into French nuclear planning exercises, without giving them any authority over launch decisions. Paris is betting that a reduced US role makes the French nuclear umbrella the only serious European alternative.

Germany is putting money into conventional forces. Chancellor Merz says the Bundeswehr, Germany's armed forces, should become "conventionally the strongest army in Europe", backed by a large defence budget increase.

The difficulty is manpower. Germany needs tens of thousands more soldiers, but its military is currently shrinking. The Bundeswehr Association calls the target "a reckless bet on the future".

SAFE Was Supposed to Unify This

The EU's SAFE defence loan instrument was meant to turn this moment into joint European procurement. The mechanism is straightforward: the European Commission borrows on capital markets and then lends to member states at favourable rates so they can buy defence equipment.

Poland moved first, signing up for €43.7 billion, with most of the money earmarked for Polish firms. Croatia, the Czech Republic and Romania followed.

The system is already under pressure. Italy has not activated its allocation. Prime Minister Meloni is holding back until Brussels gives fiscal concessions on energy spending.

SAFE also requires a European origin for procurement, which irritates eastern capitals whose military modernisation depends heavily on American-made F-35s and Abrams tanks. Kallas warned against this drift at a security conference on May 17, saying she was "very worried because I sometimes also see countries going down that lane" of bilateral deals instead of collective ones.

The result is a familiar EU problem, only with tanks and missiles attached. France is building a nuclear pillar. Germany is building a conventional one. Neither has accepted unified command.

Eastern states are bidding for American troops while using European funds designed to reduce dependence on the US. Grynkewich has given Europe a timetable measured in years. What Europe still lacks is the answer that matters most: who decides, who commands, and who pays when the last American brigade leaves.