Pentagon drops NATO submarine pledge

The United States has told NATO allies it will stop assigning submarines to the alliance, cut its fighter jet commitment by a third, and halve the strategic bomber pool available in a crisis. Pentagon envoy Alexander Velez-Green gave the figures in a closed briefing at NATO headquarters last week (Defense News, El País). Washington wants European plans to plug the gaps by early June.

For Malta, the point is not NATO membership. Malta is outside the alliance. The issue is that Europe’s security architecture, including the one that frames EU debates on defence spending and Mediterranean stability, still rests heavily on American military machinery.

The Loophole Congress Cannot Touch

The cuts are being made through the NATO Force Model, a classified registry in which member states pre-assign military assets to three levels of crisis readiness. The US is not removing troops from Europe. It is withdrawing the formal promise that reinforcements would be available if war comes (Stars and Stripes).

That distinction matters. Congress can block a US withdrawal from the NATO treaty. It can also set legal minimums for American troop numbers in Europe. But NATO Force Model pledges sit inside classified executive discretion, with no statute governing them (Military Times).

So the Pentagon can weaken NATO’s crisis-response system without a public vote on Capitol Hill. The treaty remains in place; the practical military promise behind it becomes thinner.

Elbridge Colby, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy driving the move, has made the argument plainly: European allies are "substantially more powerful than Russia and should take primary responsibility for their own conventional defense" (war.gov). The purpose is to free American assets for a possible conflict with China.

What Money Cannot Buy Fast Enough

The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that replacing US conventional capabilities inside NATO would cost about $1 trillion over 25 years (The National News). The Kiel Institute puts the nearer-term bill at €50 billion a year in extra coordinated spending (Meta-Defense). But the hardest shortages are not solved by announcing money.

Only the US operates the EA-18G Growler, the aircraft that jams enemy radar so strike jets can survive in contested airspace. Europe has no equivalent. Without Growlers, European jets flying against Russian S-400 and S-500 air defences would face radar networks they cannot suppress (RUSI).

Nuclear-powered attack submarines create the same problem under water. US Virginia-class boats can remain submerged for long periods and launch covert cruise-missile strikes at ranges beyond 1,500 km. European diesel-electric submarines must surface every 24 to 72 hours. Only France and the UK operate nuclear attack submarines, and British readiness is poor: as of March 2026, only one of five Astute-class boats was operationally deployed (19FortyFive).

Aerial refuelling shows the same dependency. The US flies more than 400 tanker aircraft. All European NATO members combined have roughly 50 to 60 (Defense News).

Thirteen European countries bought F-35s partly as insurance that Washington would remain committed. But the F-35 was designed to operate inside an American battle-management network of AWACS, the airborne radar planes, Growlers, and tankers. Remove that system and European F-35s are advanced aircraft flying without the support network that makes them fully effective (RUSI).

The Industrial Wall

European fighter production is expected to peak at about 72 aircraft a year by 2030 across the Eurofighter, Rafale, and Gripen lines. The IISS estimates Europe needs 400 more tactical combat aircraft. That is more than five years of maximum output, with no exports at all.

France’s parliament has approved an extra €36 billion in military spending through 2030 (Le Monde). But the Rafale production line is already full with export orders, and France’s nuclear submarines are sovereign assets, not equipment available for NATO pooling (IFRI).

The countries closest to Russia feel the pressure first. Poland spends 4.81% of GDP on defence, the highest rate in NATO, yet has no submarines and its F-35s will not reach full capacity until 2030 (Bankier.pl). Finland’s defence minister Antti Häkkänen called it "a serious moment for Europe" (IS.fi).

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte presented the shift as something allies had already expected: "Everybody knew this was happening" (NATO). Norway was less relaxed, calling for the transition to happen "in a structured manner" (Le Monde).

The Ankara summit on 7 and 8 July will set out the new burden-sharing plan. The exposed period runs from now until at least 2030. Governments can agree targets quickly. They cannot make a submarine appear before the yard has built it.