Poland buys Swedish subs for €4.2bn

The Baltic Sea is shallow, cold, and crowded with undersea cables, gas pipelines and sensors. For a maritime state, including Malta, the lesson is familiar: control of the seabed is no longer a specialist concern. In water this confined, one quiet submarine can change the calculation for every country on the shore.

On 29 June, Poland signed binding contracts for three Saab A26/Blekinge-class submarines under its long-delayed Orka programme. The package covers the boats, weapons, training, and maintenance capacity to be built in Poland. It will cost roughly SEK 47–50 billion (around €4.2 billion) (Saab, Defense News).

The deal strengthens deterrence in the Baltic. It also shows where European defence power still sits: in bilateral industrial relationships, rather than in EU institutions.

Closing a Forty-Year Gap

Poland’s submarine force had declined to one ageing boat, ORP Orzeł. The Orka programme is meant to stop Poland losing its underwater skills altogether before new platforms arrive (DW).

Sweden will bridge the gap by providing an older A17/Södermanland-class submarine for crew training while the A26s are built. First delivery is expected around 2030–2031 (CTV, RMF24).

The A26 uses air-independent propulsion, which allows it to remain submerged far longer than a conventional diesel-electric submarine. In the narrow waters of the Baltic, that means covert patrols and surveillance near Kaliningrad, the Gulf of Finland, and critical energy infrastructure such as LNG terminals and undersea cables (n-tv).

Who Gains, Who Loses

Saab Kockums secures decades of shipyard work in Karlskrona and Landskrona. Swedish media described the contract as historic (SVT).

Poland gains a restored undersea capability and more credibility on NATO’s eastern flank. Prime Minister Donald Tusk said the deal "changes the security situation in the Baltic qualitatively" (Polsat News).

The clearest loser is TKMS (ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems), Germany’s Kiel-based submarine builder. It offered its U212 CD design and lost out (Zeit).

That matters because Berlin is already under pressure on naval procurement. Defence Minister Boris Pistorius recently terminated the F126 frigate programme after delays and rising costs (Bundeswehr).

Lithuania also stands to gain over time, particularly around Klaipėda’s LNG terminal and undersea cables. Vilnius, however, is still prioritising land forces and the Baltic defence line (LRT).

One National Contract at a Time

Orka shows how Europe is rearming in practice: one national contract at a time.

EU tools are meant to push countries towards buying together. EDIRPA, a programme that rewards joint procurement by at least three member states, and the proposed EDIP, the European Defence Industry Programme, are designed to reduce the cost and duplication of every country shopping alone (European Commission).

NATO sets capability targets, but it does not run tenders or sign contracts (NATO).

When a frontline state has an urgent gap, it turns to a bilateral supplier that can deliver. That does not make EU instruments irrelevant. SAFE, the EU’s new defence-loan tool, may help finance purchases like this. Common standards can also push countries towards equipment that works together.

But the platform choice, the training bridge, and the decades of maintenance and upgrades after the sale remain national decisions.

What Remains Open

Publicly available documents do not confirm whether Orka receives SAFE financing. The legal terms for the interim submarine have not been published. Delivery dates carry a one-year ambiguity.

It is also not yet clear whether Poland’s promised maintenance facilities will be built as planned. For now, that remains an industrial commitment, not a completed fact. No verified Russian response has surfaced.

The submarines will not arrive for years. But the contract already shows where power sits in European defence: with states that decide, suppliers that build, and bilateral relationships that move. For now, European defence integration is being written less in Brussels communiqués than in contracts, shipyards and maintenance yards.