Poland and Romania Vie for 5,000 US Troops Pulled From Germany

Washington’s decision to pull 5,000 troops from Germany, and to cancel a brigade rotation to Poland, has exposed how uneven Europe’s security dependence on the US has become. Instead of a common European response, Warsaw and Bucharest are making separate bids for American troops while voters in parts of Europe grow more hostile to the bargain itself.

The Scramble for American Boots

Poland and Romania are both lobbying Washington to host the withdrawn troops. At the Bucharest Nine summit on May 13, a coordination forum for NATO’s eastern flank states, Romanian President Nicușor Dan said his country wants "as many American soldiers as possible" (Agerpres). Polish President Nawrocki made the same pitch: "Poland is ready to receive these troops" (Brussels Signal).

There is no joint proposal. That matters. An analysis in the Eurasia Review warned that bilateral competition of this sort risks being "disastrous for the image of the Eastern Flank" (Eurasia Review).

The Pentagon has not decided where the troops will go, or whether they will remain in Europe at all. An official told reporters that no final allocation has been made (Digi24). Washington sent an under-secretary to the B9 summit, not a cabinet principal. The message was plain enough: this administration is putting more weight on bilateral deals than on multilateral choreography.

Germany's Missile Gap

Berlin has its own problem. Chancellor Merz’s government submitted a formal request last July to buy 400 Tomahawk missiles. Ten months later, the Pentagon has still not responded. Defence State Secretary Müller declined to confirm whether Washington had even acknowledged the letter (Defense News).

Separately, on May 18, the State Department approved an $11.9 billion naval combat systems package for Germany, covering radar and fire control systems (Ground News). The two procurement files are different tracks, moving through different offices. Still, the contrast is difficult to miss: naval electronics worth billions move forward while the strategic missiles Berlin asked for remain unanswered.

Germany’s fallback is ELSA, a European long-range strike programme being developed with Britain. Asked whether it could deliver before 2030, officials would not commit. Analysts say ELSA could become "a political brand, a procurement club, or a genuine European defense structure" because its governance is still undefined (ESUT).

Fractures Inside Governments

The competition for US favour is also opening cracks inside national governments.

In Poland, President Nawrocki told Trump on May 3 that Poland would welcome the withdrawn troops. Prime Minister Tusk accused him of "throwing mud at his own country" by implying the government was failing on security (Rzeczpospolita). The National Security Bureau then revealed it had received no advance information from the Defence Ministry about the cancelled rotation (Radio ZET). Poland’s cohabitation, with a president and prime minister from rival parties, has become a security weakness.

In Italy, the split runs through the cabinet. Defence Minister Crosetto wants to meet NATO spending targets, while Economy Minister Giorgetti argues that energy bills must come first (Askanews). That budget fight is taking place in a country where public trust in Trump’s America has fallen to 17%, below China and Russia, according to polling reported by several European outlets (L'Unità, Euractiv).

Hungary alone refused to sign the B9 joint declaration, which described Russia as "the most significant and direct threat to Allies' security." Budapest’s footnote said the "incoming Hungarian Government" would decide later (Norwegian Government). The new Tisza government says it wants to be a "valued Western ally", but it is still hedging on every concrete commitment: no weapons for Ukraine and no participation in EU joint borrowing for defence (Világgazdaság).

The Test That Hasn't Come Yet

The NATO summit in Ankara this July will decide whether the withdrawn troops remain in Europe or return home. For Malta, even outside NATO, this is not a distant military reshuffle. EU security policy increasingly shapes budgets, energy choices and the political space left for small states when larger allies set the tempo.

The harder question comes later. Several allied governments are now discussing defence budgets of 4-5% of GDP. None has yet gone before voters while cutting social programmes to pay for it. The race to keep the alliance intact is already weakening its political foundations, and the electoral reckoning over the bill has not started.