Poland buys three Saab A26 submarines

Poland will sign a contract on 29 June for three Saab A26 submarines, diesel-electric boats designed to move quietly in the shallow Baltic Sea (Defence24, Euronews). The deal closes almost three decades of failed procurement. More than buying vessels, Warsaw is trying to save a military skill set: crews who know how to operate underwater, yards that can maintain the boats, and the supply chain needed to keep them at sea.

What Poland Is Actually Buying

The A26 is a 66-metre submarine fitted with air-independent propulsion, which allows a conventional boat to remain underwater for weeks without surfacing to recharge its batteries. It has torpedo tubes and a modular bay that can carry special forces or unmanned underwater vehicles (Marine Poland). Saab built the design for the kind of sea Poland has to operate in: shallow water, heavy commercial traffic, coastal noise, and very short distances between NATO and Russian naval zones (Saab).

The contract is not limited to three hulls. It also covers crew training and investment in Polish shipyards, so that Warsaw can eventually service and repair the submarines at home instead of relying on Swedish yards in a crisis (Defence24).

The most immediate part may be a bridge lease of an older Swedish Södermanland-class submarine. Poland’s submarine arm has been reduced to one vessel, ORP Orzeł, commissioned in 1985 (Fakt). The first A26 is expected between 2030 and 2032 (Rzeczpospolita). Without an interim boat, Poland risks losing its last trained submariners before the new fleet arrives.

A NATO Sea That Still Lacks NATO Submarines

Finland and Sweden’s entry into NATO in 2023 and 2024 turned the Baltic into a sea where every coastal state except Russia is now in the alliance (Puolustusvoimat). That changes the map, but it does not automatically create deterrence. NATO provides command structures and planning. It does not buy submarines, train crews, or maintain vessels for member states.

Poland is filling a national gap in a Nordic-Baltic underwater theatre where Sweden already has decades of experience (Marine Poland). A quiet A26 does not need to fire to matter. Its value is that an adversary must assume a NATO platform may be near a chokepoint or port approach, making hostile planning more complicated (BAE Systems).

Industrial politics also shaped the result. German-language coverage presented the decision as a defeat for Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems, which had also competed (Euronews DE). There has been no public scoring to show why Sweden won. The practical explanation is likely simpler: Saab offered a Baltic-specific boat, an interim vessel to keep crews alive, and a route towards Polish repair capacity (Rzeczpospolita).

The Cable Question Submarines Cannot Answer Alone

The deal comes as Baltic underwater infrastructure faces grey-zone threats, from anchor-dragging to suspected sabotage of data cables, electricity interconnectors and pipelines (FIIA). Maltese readers do not need much convincing that islands and coastal economies live through cables and ports. But submarines are only an indirect answer to this problem. The A26s add hidden surveillance and uncertainty for anyone planning hostile action. Actual cable defence needs constant sensing, coast guards, drones, attribution tools and repair ships (War on the Rocks). Finland has tested one concrete method: using distributed acoustic sensing on existing cables to detect anchor threats before damage is done (Elisa).

The EU is building a separate layer. On 23 June, the European Commission funded the first two Regional Cable Hubs, including €2.5 million for a Baltic hub and a separate €40 million call for rapid submarine-cable repair capacity (European Commission, 2EU Brussels). Finland is coordinating the Baltic hub with Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Latvia and Sweden. Poland is not in that group. It is buying military capability through a bilateral Swedish route while the EU’s first cable-security coordination runs through another channel.

The 29 June signing closes a procurement failure that lasted a generation. The real test is whether Poland’s three submarines become part of the wider system of sensors, patrols, repair teams and NATO command before the next cable incident exposes the gaps.