Romania stalls Doicești reactor plan

The engineering of modular nuclear power is proven, yet its financial bankability remains a small, unfulfilled promise.
Image composition · tobriefSmall modular reactors are nuclear energy's attempt to solve a cost problem as much as an engineering one. Instead of building one huge, bespoke power station over many years, the idea is to manufacture smaller reactors in repeatable units and assemble them on site. The promise is familiar enough to any island economy that imports almost everything: standardisation should bring the price down once production moves beyond the first few units.
Romania's Doicești project was meant to show that this could work in Europe. Instead, it is exposing the awkward first step. The business case depends on repetition, but someone has to finance the expensive first reactor before there is any repetition to benefit from.
The first ferry is always the most expensive
The Doicești plan was for six small reactor modules on a former coal site. Each would produce 77 megawatts of electricity, enough together to supply a mid-sized city with steady power around the clock (Economica). For Malta, which still relies heavily on imported energy and interconnection, that promise of stable generation is not an abstract selling point. It is the kind of security governments like to talk about when markets turn volatile.
The American developer, NuScale, has the first US regulatory design approval for a small modular reactor, which means its safety case passed the regulator's test (NRC). The immediate obstacle is therefore not reactor physics. It is the contract.
Romania wanted a cautious structure: buy one module first, see how it performs, then decide on the other five. According to Romanian reporting, NuScale did not accept that risk-sharing model, and the framework agreement remained unsigned (HotNews). US financing of roughly $7 billion was reportedly available through export-credit agencies, but only if the Romanian government provided a guarantee. That guarantee never arrived (Adevărul).
On 15 July, Nuclearelectrica shareholders will vote on whether the original project strategy still makes sense. Conditions linked to a February 2026 investment decision were not met by the June deadline (BVB/SNN). The result could be new contract terms, a different technology partner, or a redesigned project (Bursa).
That is not a formal cancellation. But when Europe's most advanced small modular reactor deployment pauses to renegotiate the basics, it says something about the distance between nuclear policy ambition and projects that banks, governments and consumers are willing to underwrite.
NuScale has been here before. Its earlier flagship project in Idaho was cancelled after costs rose and too few utility buyers signed up (ANS). Regulatory approval showed the design could satisfy safety requirements. It did not show that it could be built at a price customers would accept.
What it would cost on your electricity bill
An independent Romanian analysis put the construction-payback part of Doicești's electricity price at roughly €244 per megawatt-hour, rising to about €276/MWh once operating costs are included (Romania Military). This is an outside estimate, not an official tariff.
The comparison still matters. Utility-scale solar and wind in Europe often come in much cheaper per unit of energy, although they do not provide the same constant output unless paired with batteries, backup generation or grid support (Lazard). That distinction is familiar in Malta too: cheap generation on paper is not the same thing as a secure system at 8pm in August.
Romania's interim prime minister Ilie Bolojan has questioned the spending already committed: roughly $240 million spent, with another $600 million potentially needed before construction even begins (Adevărul, ZF).
Every European SMR faces the same question
Romania is not the exception. Across Europe, governments looking at small modular reactors are also looking at public guarantees, price floors or state participation. Private investors are not lining up to carry the full risk of a reactor type that has never operated commercially.
Poland has been the most direct. Orlen Synthos Green Energy has applied for what it calls the EU's first Contract for Difference for small modular reactors, covering 14 reactors (OSGE). A Contract for Difference is a public price guarantee: if market electricity prices fall below an agreed level, the state pays the difference. The mechanism admits the problem openly. SMR power is not yet expected to compete on the open market without protection.
Sweden has gone further, with the state taking a 60% stake in its Videberg nuclear venture and instructing regulators to design long-term price-hedging tools that fit within EU rules (Swedish government). Czechia is linking its Rolls-Royce SMR plans to domestic industrial participation and state backing, though the financing terms remain unclear (World Nuclear News).
The pattern is plain enough: no European country has yet shown how to finance first-of-a-kind small modular reactors on market terms alone.
Doicești's reassessment does not prove that small reactors have failed. It shows what the next test really is. Governments must design contracts that make the first plant financeable without disguising the cost from households and businesses that will pay electricity bills for decades. The logic of repeatable factory-built reactors may still work. The first one still needs a buyer.
How was this article?
Help us get better
Help us get better
Details about this article
- Model:
- claude-opus-4-6
- Generated:
- 7/3/2026, 10:27:16 AM
- Pipeline run:
- eu_pipeline_20260703_084055
- Watermark:
- SynthID (Google's invisible watermark)
- Human review:
- None before publication