Romania flags 40 drone breaches

Since Russia began hitting Ukrainian ports on the Danube, Romania has recorded more than 40 airspace incursions (Euromaidan Press). Many passed almost unnoticed outside Eastern Europe, while similar incidents over the Baltics made front pages further west. The difference says something uncomfortable about Europe’s sense of urgency: Romania is taking the daily pressure on NATO’s south-eastern edge, but several western capitals still react faster when the same threat appears in the north.

Two cases forced attention. On 29 May, a Russian Geran-2 drone hit an apartment block in Galați, injuring two people. On 5 June, a Ukrainian maritime drone, reportedly pushed off course by Russian electronic jamming, self-detonated inside Constanța port, Romania’s Defence Ministry said. Bucharest took both incidents to the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s top political body where all 32 allies must agree, on 10 June, asking for stronger counter-drone capabilities. The response was solidarity. Romania is asking for radars and jammers.

Four Minutes, No Good Option

At Galați, Romania tracked the incoming drone and scrambled F-16s. The problem was the law and the geography. In peacetime, pilots operate under tight rules; they also have to calculate civilian risk and avoid firing too close to Ukrainian airspace. By the time those constraints were weighed, the chance to shoot had passed. The whole episode lasted minutes.

Constanța exposed a different weakness. A maritime drone entered a commercial port, triggered civilian evacuations, and showed how poorly existing sensors cope with small drones moving at very low altitude. For Malta, with its own dependence on ports and shipping, this is not a distant Black Sea problem. The same cheap technology that unsettles a NATO port can unsettle any maritime economy that assumes the harbour perimeter is easier to police than the open sea.

NATO’s standing air-policing mission, in which allied jets guard one another’s airspace in peacetime, was built around aircraft interception. It was not designed for cheap drones flying low and close to terrain. The alliance’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence network works better at medium and high altitudes. Below that, along the eastern flank, there is a gap that former NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană has publicly acknowledged. Radar upgrades and counter-drone deliveries are not expected before 2027.

The same weakness stretches from the Black Sea to the Baltic. A Romanian F-16 shot down a drone over Estonia on 19 May; on 8 June, NATO fighters destroyed another over Latvia. Yet frontline states are not responding in the same way. Their choices show how NATO works when pressure is constant and equipment is scarce.

Poland Builds Alone, France Shows Up Without the Right Tools

Poland is not waiting for allied procurement cycles. Warsaw is building its own radar and missile network instead of making a public NATO demand. The Wisła programme adds 360-degree radars to Patriot batteries, while Tarcza Wschód envisages 700 kilometres of fortifications along the eastern border. Poland’s calculation is simple: allied kit will arrive too slowly, so it is paying to reduce dependence on emergency help. Romania, already seeing drones hit residential buildings, does not have the luxury of that timetable.

France offers another lesson. Paris keeps around 1,400 troops at Romania’s Cincu base, with artillery, tanks and Mamba air-defence systems (Le JDD). French Rafales shot down a drone over Latvia on 8 June, showing that the alliance can act quickly when the chain of command is clear. But there is no public record of a French counter-drone package for Romania’s Black Sea coast. The troops are present; the specific tools Bucharest needs most are not.

The Gap Nobody Has Named

No public source has identified which radars, jammers or maritime counter-drone systems will reach Romania, who will supply them, or when. As El País noted, high-end systems such as Patriot batteries are not built to shoot down drones costing a few thousand dollars. One Patriot interceptor costs millions; a Geran-2 costs less than a used car.

Romania’s presidential adviser Cristian Diaconescu warned that a communiqué-style response would show allies had failed to understand what was happening on the ground. NATO’s political commitments remain solid. The capability to enforce them against the low-altitude threat hitting Romania today is still missing.

The attention gap makes the problem worse. When a drone enters Baltic airspace, European media tend to treat it as an alliance-level event. When dozens cross into Romania over months, the response is slower and quieter. Procurement works in years. The drones arrive day by day.