Russian Ships Tied to Drone Incursions

Late last year, unidentified drones were seen over three air bases in the Netherlands and Belgium: Volkel, Eindhoven and Kleine-Brogel. These are not ordinary military sites. All three store US nuclear warheads under NATO's nuclear-sharing system, where European allies host American weapons that can only be used with Washington's authorisation.

For Malta, a neutral country but not a country outside Europe's security map, the point is less the nuclear detail than the method. A new assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies says the flights appear to fit a broader pattern: 144 reported drone incidents across 13 European countries between August 2024 and February 2026, which IISS considers highly likely to be part of a Kremlin-directed campaign (IISS, New York Times).

The pattern is credible. The proof has not been made public.

Shadow Fleet, Double Use

IISS points to Russia's shadow fleet: tankers and cargo ships that use opaque ownership structures and flags of convenience to keep Russian oil moving despite EU sanctions. Malta knows this world well. Ship registers, beneficial ownership and maritime services are not abstract issues for an island economy built around ports, finance and compliance work.

The same opacity that helps hide oil shipments can also help conceal deniable operations. IISS names two vessels, Hav Dolphin and Seasons 1, linking them to drone episodes near UK and German military sites (BBC, Spiegel). The Dutch and Belgian sightings reportedly coincided with Russian-linked vessels going dark in the North Sea, meaning they switched off tracking transponders that normally show a ship's position (Guardian).

German federal police and Belgian forces searched Hav Dolphin and found nothing conclusive (t-online). No government has released radar tracks, radio-frequency intercepts or recovered drone parts tying one aircraft to one ship. IISS has produced an intelligence-style assessment, not a forensic case file.

The Hard Part Is Where the Ship Is

Whether Europe can act depends on geography, counted in nautical miles. Inside territorial waters, roughly 22 km from the coast, a state has full sovereignty. A ship launching drones there loses its right to innocent passage, the rule that allows foreign vessels to pass through peacefully, and can be stopped (UNCLOS).

Outside that line, in the exclusive economic zone or on the open sea, the law changes. The ship is mainly answerable to the country whose flag it flies. A merchant vessel sitting just beyond territorial waters is hard to board on suspicion alone, even if intelligence services believe it launched drones minutes earlier. Europe may suspect the ship, but suspicion does not automatically give police the power to board it.

The EU's strongest tools work at chokepoints, not in open water. The Council of the EU, where ministers from member states take binding decisions, has sanctioned hundreds of shadow-fleet vessels through its 16th and 17th Russia sanctions packages, blocking port access and maritime services (Council 16th, Council 17th). NATO shares intelligence and coordinates deterrence, but says the first responsibility for countering hybrid threats remains with the country being targeted (NATO). A drone over a Dutch air base is, first of all, a Dutch problem.

Ready, Fragmented, or Guessing

National readiness differs sharply. Finland is closest to being prepared. Its Border Guard, which also functions as a defence asset, is receiving €44 million for counter-drone systems along the eastern border and coast, including jammers and interceptor drones (Yle). Finland also leads a Baltic maritime surveillance operation using unmanned aircraft and satellite tracking (Rajavartiolaitos).

Germany is more fragmented. Security for civilian infrastructure belongs to the Länder, the federal states. The coast guard is a coordination structure rather than one unified agency. Constitutional limits on using the military at home mean the Bundeswehr may be able to track a drone, but cannot easily shoot it down except in narrow circumstances (Art. 87a GG).

Denmark shows the opposite risk: politics moving faster than evidence. After drone reports near Copenhagen airport, police reviewed radar, CCTV and witness material and could not confirm that drones were actually present. The rhetoric had outrun what investigators could prove (Berlingske, Ground News).

Europe can often see the pattern. It cannot yet reliably stop it. In some cases, it cannot yet prove the pattern is real.