Serbia’s Refinery Waits On Washington

The US Treasury's sanctions arm, OFAC, extended three separate permissions on 28-29 August. Taken together, they keep Serbia's only major refinery operating, allow crude oil to keep moving through Croatia, and let Hungary's MOL group continue talks with Russia over the purchase of a majority stake. All three expire on 30 September (NIS, N1, Portfolio).

It is often covered as one sanctions story. It is really three legal permissions, each protecting a different part of the supply chain. If any one of them falls away, a different link breaks.

Three permissions, three pressure points

The first licence lets NIS, Serbia's national oil company, keep doing the ordinary things without which an oil company stops being an oil company: importing crude, refining it at Pančevo south of Belgrade, selling fuel, paying workers and settling transactions. NIS is majority-owned by Gazprom Neft, the Russian state-linked oil producer. That ownership is the problem.

Banks, insurers and shipping firms generally avoid sanctioned entities because even routine payments can put their access to the US financial system at risk. Without OFAC's licence, counterparties would not process NIS's money. The refinery would not need to be bombed, seized or formally closed. It would simply lose the financial oxygen needed to operate (NIS, NIS).

The second licence covers JANAF, Croatia's state-controlled Adriatic pipeline company. JANAF physically moves crude from the port of Omišalj to Pančevo. Its permission is narrower: the licence wording limits it to activities "customary and necessary" for transporting oil under its existing NIS contract (Index.hr). When a previous licence lapsed in late 2025, transport was blocked for weeks (Bloomberg Adria).

The third licence is different again. It allows MOL, Hungary's oil group, to continue negotiating with Gazprom Neft over the Russian-controlled 56.15% majority stake in NIS. This is permission to talk, not approval to buy (Telex, Portfolio).

MOL and Serbia signed a conditional shareholder agreement in June. Under that arrangement, Belgrade would raise its stake by 5 percentage points and gain blocking rights over key corporate decisions (Caliber, Telex). Until OFAC approves the actual sale, however, no shares move. MOL wants more regional refining and retail weight. Serbia wants the Russian owner out, while keeping a hand on a company that matters to daily life.

Serbia needs the oil, Croatia needs the revenue

For Serbia, this is not an abstract sanctions file. Pančevo covers around 80% of the country's fuel demand, and much of the crude reaches it through the JANAF route (Index.hr). NIS sold 3.023 million tonnes of petroleum products in 2025 and made a first-half 2026 net profit of 9.8 billion dinars (NIS IR, NIS IR).

Serbian Energy Minister Dubravka Đedović Handanović has said the MOL-Gazprom Neft talks are in their "final phase" (Biznis.rs). Belgrade has sounded close to a deal before. More telling is the temporary export ban on oil products through 30 September, which suggests officials are guarding domestic supply while waiting for Washington's next move (Newsmax Balkans).

Croatia's immediate interest is just as clear. The NIS contract accounts for more than a third of JANAF's revenue, according to Croatian public broadcaster HRT (HRT). Prime Minister Andrej Plenković has said a completed MOL-NIS deal would be "good for JANAF" because it would remove the sanctions trigger entirely (N1 Croatia).

The longer-term calculation is less comfortable for Zagreb. JANAF earns because it controls the route. A MOL-controlled refining network, already including Croatia's INA and Slovakia's Slovnaft, could eventually give Hungary and Serbia an incentive to build an alternative pipeline. That would reduce Croatia's leverage as a transit country (Večernji list).

Continuity without resolution

The pattern is now familiar. NIS has been re-licensed to 20 March, then to 31 July, and now to 30 September. Each extension keeps fuel flowing and workers paid. None forces Gazprom Neft to surrender control or answers where the money ultimately goes.

The Serbian case, like the Bulgarian one, shows how temporary licences can keep sanctioned refineries alive for months while leaving ownership unresolved. That matters for small EU states too. Malta knows the difference between formal compliance and a business model that remains exposed to reputational and regulatory risk.

These permissions buy continuity. They do not deliver ownership change. MOL and OFAC are the two actors that can turn the talking licence into a completed deal. Until then, Serbia's fuel system runs on rolling American legal permission, one month at a time.