Hungary’s Single-Bid Tender Problem

19.6% of Hungarian public tenders closed with only one bidder last year. Behind another HUF 309.5bn in procurement contracts sit private-equity ownership structures that make it hard to see who ultimately benefits. The largest central purchasing bodies, which handled more than HUF 3,700bn between 2020 and 2025, gave little cooperation when Hungary's anti-corruption watchdog asked for information (Telex, 24.hu).

The figures come from Hungary's Integrity Authority, the body Budapest created under EU pressure to get access to frozen funds. Its 2025 summary report, published this week, is its broadest audit of public procurement so far. The authority's conclusion is direct: overpricing is built into the system, competition is regularly switched off, and inflated prices are rewarded rather than corrected.

How prices stay inflated

The mechanism matters. Bid prices are compared with an "estimated value", but that estimate does not have to reflect the real market cost. Once an inflated contract is accepted, it can become the benchmark for the next one. The result is above-market spending that feeds on itself over time (HVG).

Contracting authorities can shape the size of tenders to decide who gets in. They merge contracts so only large firms qualify, or split them to avoid open tendering (Portfolio). Technical specifications are narrowed until only one company fits. The same firms keep appearing, bidding together and winning together. Construction and energy, two of the state's biggest spending areas, show the worst overpricing.

There is also a gap in central purchasing. Contracts for public-sector energy, vehicles, furniture and travel do not appear on the public procurement platform at all. Their value is above HUF 500bn before energy costs, and could be four to five times higher once energy is included (HVG).

Three EU locks on Hungary's money

The report does not, by itself, freeze or release EU money. Three separate EU mechanisms decide whether Hungary gets paid. In December 2022, the Council, where member-state governments vote, suspended €6.3bn in cohesion funds under the Conditionality Regulation, the EU tool that links protection of the EU budget to rule-of-law standards. Hungary's post-pandemic Recovery and Resilience Plan also includes 27 "super-milestones" on anti-corruption and procurement safeguards that must be met before money flows (European Commission). Separately, EU cohesion rules can block reimbursements if governance conditions are not met, without any new political vote (Common Provisions Regulation).

For a country like Malta, where EU funds are often visible in roads, regeneration projects and public infrastructure, this is the part that matters beyond Hungary. Conditionality is not a Brussels slogan. It is the legal machinery that decides whether money is paid when public procurement cannot be trusted.

None of these three locks opens automatically because of the report. But the report is evidence produced by the very institution Brussels required Hungary to create. If that institution says prices remain inflated, the Commission has to decide whether reform promises are enough to unblock funds. The European Court of Auditors has separately warned that traceability and transparency of recovery spending remain insufficient across the bloc.

The Poland problem

Poland makes the decision harder. In February 2024, Brussels released around €137bn in EU funds to Poland's reformist government before judicial reforms had been fully tested. That choice now hangs over every conditionality case. It showed that political direction can count as much as measurable results.

Hungary's Parliament passed new procurement legislation on 23 June, including stricter conflict-of-interest rules and more transparency on beneficial ownership, meaning the real people behind companies. If Brussels pays because Prime Minister Péter Magyar has changed Hungary's politics, before tenders become more competitive and cheaper, the EU's rule-of-law funding tool starts to look political rather than rule-based.

Slovakia has already drawn its own lesson. While Hungary tries to move back towards EU conditions after its fund freeze, Slovakia is beginning to repeat its mistakes, Denník N reported. In April, the European Parliament called on the Commission to consider using the same mechanism against Bratislava.

The credibility test is simple to state and difficult to pass: what proof does Brussels require before money moves? Hungary's own watchdog has produced evidence that the procurement machine still inflates prices. What the Commission does with that evidence will say more about EU conditionality than another law passed in Budapest.