Sulyok Signs Away Presidency

Tamás Sulyok has signed a constitutional amendment that ends his own presidency. Hungary's Parliament approved the change by 139 votes to 6, and Sulyok then put his name to the document that removes him from office the day after it enters into force (Telex, Euractiv). The process followed the law. The politics are much harder to dismiss. Europe now has to decide whether Prime Minister Péter Magyar is rebuilding democratic checks, or simply using a new supermajority to replace the old one.

The Tool and Its Builder

Hungary's president is elected by Parliament, not directly by voters. That makes the office dependent on parliamentary numbers. Magyar's TISZA party has a constitutional supermajority, so the result was settled before the vote was called. The real issue is not whether he could do it, but what this power now means.

The amendment goes beyond Sulyok. It also requires Constitutional Court judges over 70 to retire, opening seats that were filled during Viktor Orbán's long hold over the state (G4Media). Before the vote, Magyar gave Sulyok a blunt choice: sign the amendment, or face formal removal proceedings (TVN24).

Sulyok described the amendment as "unprecedented and shameful", then signed it anyway. His explanation was legalistic: once a constitutional act had passed through the proper legislative procedure, he had no legal ground to refuse it (Denník N). He could have sent it to the Constitutional Court, but only for a procedural check. The court lost the power to review the substance of constitutional amendments in 2013, under Orbán himself (Telex).

That is the uncomfortable symmetry. Magyar is dismantling Orbán's institutional system with the constitutional machinery Orbán built. The method resembles the same majoritarian engineering he says he is undoing.

Why Neighbours Read It Differently

Poland understood the problem immediately. Donald Tusk's government faced similar institutional locks after defeating PiS, but did not have the constitutional majority needed to break them. Magyar does, and he is using it quickly. Rzeczpospolita framed the Hungarian vote as a choice for "a change of regime", not just a change of government (Rzeczpospolita). DW warned that Hungary shows both the advantage of moving fast and the danger that speed starts replacing standards (DW).

Slovak coverage put the dilemma most sharply. Denník N asked whether an "occupied" state can be repaired through extraordinary constitutional tools without reproducing the same winner-takes-all logic (Denník N). Ta3 reported critics calling the amendment an ad hoc change aimed at one person, the kind of accusation once directed at Orbán (ta3).

German-language coverage was less interested in Sulyok himself. Berlin's concern is whether Magyar changes Hungary's behaviour in the Council, where EU governments decide collectively and foreign policy often needs unanimity. Budapest has spent years blocking Ukraine-related sanctions and aid. For the rest of the EU, that may matter more than who sits in the Hungarian presidency (SRF).

What It Doesn't Unlock

Sulyok's removal does not free Hungary's frozen EU money. The Council's 2022 conditionality decision suspended 55% of commitments under three cohesion-policy programmes because rule-of-law breaches were judged to affect the EU budget (Council of the EU). Cohesion funds are the EU money used to narrow development gaps between regions and member states. Malta knows their weight well: from roads to regeneration projects around the harbour area, EU money is not an abstraction here.

The Commission treats institutional checks and balances as a core rule-of-law category (European Commission), so the amendment will matter in Brussels' assessment. But it does not automatically trigger a release of funds. Hungary still has to show verifiable reforms in anticorruption, procurement transparency, and judicial independence.

That distinction matters for Malta too. A small member state lives inside these mechanisms: the same EU system that funds infrastructure also judges whether national institutions can be trusted with public money. The Commission cannot reward anti-Orbán intent. It has to decide whether Hungary now has guarantees that did not exist before. Magyar has shown he can dismantle the old system. He has not yet shown that the new one will constrain him.