Sweden Picks French Frigates

Sweden has confirmed its largest defence order since the Gripen fighter programme: four frigates from France's Naval Group for about 40 billion SEK (~€3.5 billion). The deal creates a fleet of 13 identical warships across three NATO navies, but it was struck bilaterally, outside the EU defence procurement structures Brussels has spent years building.

The Offer Nobody Could Match

Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson announced the purchase on 19 May. Naval Group beat Britain's Babcock, which had teamed up with Sweden's Saab, and Spain's Navantia. Defence Minister Pål Jonson cited delivery speed, proven technology, and cost-sharing with France and Greece, which already operate the same vessel (Theatrum Belli).

The FDI frigate is not a paper project. France commissioned its first hull in October 2025, and Greece received the HS Kimon in December 2025. Swedish evaluators could board and inspect the ship at sea, something the rival bids could not offer. Naval Group also offered to divert hulls from the French Navy's own production line to meet Sweden's 2030 deadline (Forum Militaire).

That is where ownership matters. The French state holds a majority stake in Naval Group. A listed company such as Babcock, already carrying heavy overruns on its Type 31 frigate for the Royal Navy, cannot easily compete with a state-backed firm prepared to rearrange its own navy's schedule to win an export order.

Macron's Sovereignty Pitch

President Macron described the sale as proof of "a strong and sovereign Europe within NATO" (Économie Matin). The phrase does a lot of work. A French-backed company sold French-designed warships, with production priority ultimately set in Paris, while the result was presented as European strategic autonomy.

The EU's joint procurement fund, EDIP (the European Defence Industrial Programme, adopted in December 2025), had no role in the deal. EDIP was designed to push member states towards buying defence equipment together, but its first funding round is aimed at smaller items such as drones and ammunition. Frigates sit far above what the programme can realistically finance. Sweden went bilateral because the bilateral route delivered.

For smaller member states, including Malta, that is the practical lesson. Brussels can design procurement mechanisms, but capitals will use them only when they offer speed, money, and political certainty. In this case, the lever was not an EU framework but French industrial capacity backed by the French state.

By the end of 2025, Naval Group's order book had reached €32 billion, and the FDI platform now covers 13 frigates across three countries (Le JDD, Theatrum Belli).

The French Hub

The FDI network does create cross-border work. Greek shipyards at Salamis have built hull blocks for both Greek and French frigates. Sweden will add Saab weapons, including RBS15 anti-ship missiles and Giraffe radar, to French hulls.

But the structure is still hub-and-spoke. France designs the platform, controls the production timetable, and owns the intellectual property. Partners contribute components, while Paris keeps the centre of gravity.

Italy's absence says something. Fincantieri did not bid. Its joint venture with Naval Group, Naviris, has underperformed; a French admiral said in early 2026 that it had "failed to meet expectations" (Forum Militaire).

Brussels wants collaborative procurement: member states pooling demand and sharing industrial returns across the bloc. What is emerging instead is a French-led network that keeps spending inside the EU but concentrates design authority and strategic leverage in Paris.

Denmark is reportedly considering its own frigate purchase. Thirteen ships across three navies already create pull through spare parts, training systems, and upgrade cycles. Each buyer makes the next one more likely. For Copenhagen, the question is whether it would be joining a European defence programme or a French industrial bloc. Increasingly, those two things are beginning to look the same.