Sweden Expels Russian Intelligence Operatives

Three diplomats have left Sweden quietly in recent days after the government forced them out on the basis of evidence gathered by Säpo, the Swedish security service. Säpo says it documented a Russian intelligence operation aimed at understanding how Swedish political decisions are made (Säpo, SVT). Two of the expelled diplomats were officers of the SVR, Russia's foreign intelligence service. The third was a recruited agent operating from the embassy of a non-European country in Stockholm.

None of the three will be prosecuted. They had diplomatic immunity, which means the host state can expel them but cannot put them before a court unless that immunity is waived. For Malta, where embassies are small, networks are tight, and political access often runs through personal familiarity rather than formal channels, the Swedish case is a reminder of how intelligence work usually begins: not with drama, but with patient mapping of who knows whom and where decisions are really made.

Sweden says it interrupted the information-gathering phase of an operation intended to prepare future influence campaigns. The public evidence points in that direction: meetings were watched, tasking was understood, and the collectors were removed. What has not been shown is that the intelligence was ever used to change a Swedish decision, plant a story, or shift a vote.

What Säpo Documented

Säpo's deputy head of operations, Christoffer Wedelin, said the service had monitored meetings in the Stockholm area between the recruited agent and the two SVR handlers. Säpo says it knew what was discussed and what tasks were assigned (Säpo). SVT broadcast surveillance images of the encounters (SVT). Dagens Nyheter identified the recruited agent as a diplomat from a non-European embassy, a cutout that made the Russian direction of the operation harder for Swedish targets to detect (DN).

According to Säpo, the aim was to learn how Swedish decisions are made so that later operations could exploit "polarising issues" and discredit Sweden, NATO, and the EU (Säpo). That is the language of preparation, not execution. Justice Minister Gunnar Strömmer said the operation had not achieved its aims and was not connected to Sweden's September election (TV4). Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson said it had been "close to politics", but did not identify the offices or circles involved (DN).

Säpo has not said whether the targets were ministers, civil servants, MPs, or party staff. Foreign Minister Maria Malmer Stenergard confirmed that the three were made to leave because of their activities in Sweden. No indictment or court filing has been published. Diplomatic immunity shifted the response from criminal justice to discreet expulsion.

Why NATO and the EU Care

A government's internal red lines are valuable intelligence. They tell Moscow where Sweden might bend inside NATO or EU negotiations. Since Sweden joined the alliance, any information about how Stockholm forms positions on Ukraine, sanctions, or defence commitments gives Russia a way to anticipate, pressure, or divide. Säpo made that link explicit by naming both NATO and the EU as institutions Russia intended to discredit.

This matters for small states as much as for large ones. Malta knows the EU not as a distant machine but as a place where national leverage depends on timing, alliances, and knowing when a file is moving. In Brussels, one well-placed diplomat can observe several channels at once: national representatives, lobbyists, alliance officials, and embassy staff all operate within the same dense political space.

EUobserver reported in July that Brussels hosts 187 embassies, 94 permanent representations, and 131 international organisations, and that 68 Russian diplomats have been expelled from Belgium on espionage grounds since 2022 (EUobserver). The point is not that every diplomat is a spy. It is that diplomatic cover gives intelligence services legal access to the very rooms where political positions are formed.

The Swedish case is not isolated. Finland's security service Supo and military intelligence warned in July that Russia's FSB was conducting cyber-espionage through compromised network devices, prompting Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen to summon the Russian ambassador (Supo, MTV Uutiset). The European Council, where EU heads of state and government set the bloc's political direction, denounced what it called Russia's "malicious cyber ecosystem", identifying FSB units targeting member states across the continent (AP).

The Missing Evidence Is the Point

The Swedish case stops at the line between espionage and interference. Säpo has shown that it could map an operation, identify the players, and remove them. It has not shown that the intelligence collected was ever used: no planted narrative, no manipulated decision, no compromised vote. Säpo has also not named the third country, the Swedish targets, or the specific material sought.

Russian intelligence services collect first and influence later. Sweden says it caught the collection. The unanswered question is narrower, but politically important: which part of Swedish politics was exposed, and how far had the operation gone before the state shut it down?