Traders Take 45% of Greek Gas Exports

More than 45% of the available gas export capacity from Greece into Bulgaria has been booked in DESFA's annual auctions for the next four gas years (in.gr, iefimerida). The buyers are DEPA Commercial, Greece's main gas trader, and Atlantic SEE LNG Trade. They are paying upfront for multi-year rights on a route built to move non-Russian gas north through south-eastern Europe.

The volume is not large: about 13,000 MWh a day, according to iefimerida. But a company booking pipeline capacity years ahead is sending a more serious signal than a single spot-market cargo. The question is how much a reserved pipeline slot really changes Europe's dependence on Russian gas.

Buying a Lane, Not the Fuel

A capacity auction does not sell gas. It sells the right to use an entry or exit point on the pipeline network, under EU rules that standardise how cross-border slots are allocated (EU CAM network code). It is like reserving space on a road: the lane is yours, but you still need the vehicle, the fuel and someone willing to receive it.

A trader still needs a seller and a buyer. It must nominate the shipment a day ahead, secure capacity on every next stretch of the route, and deliver the gas at a price that still makes sense. Capacity can be used fully, used partly, held as insurance, or left idle if the price difference disappears.

Bulgaria Gets the Gas, but at What Cost Farther North?

The stronger evidence is already visible one border up from Greece. Bulgaria receives non-Russian gas through Greek-linked infrastructure. The Greece-Bulgaria interconnector, known as IGB, carries 3 bcm a year, with plans to expand towards 5 bcm (ICGB). Bulgaria's energy regulator KEVR set the July regulated gas price at €37.70/MWh before access charges, transmission tariffs, excise and VAT (KEVR, Fakti). That price already reflects a supply mix that includes Azeri pipeline gas and LNG bought at auction.

The pipes are there. The commercial case farther north is less settled. LNG arriving at a Greek terminal has to be turned back into gas, injected into the Greek grid, moved to the Bulgarian border, and then pushed through Romania, Hungary or Slovakia. Each border adds a regulated transmission tariff (EU tariff network code). With every crossing, the political story of diversification becomes a test of price.

According to Serbia Energy, Bulgaria's regulated price was about €4/MWh below TTF futures. TTF is Europe's main wholesale gas benchmark, set at the Dutch trading hub. By the time the same gas reaches a factory in Hungary or Slovakia, transport costs may have swallowed that margin.

Hungary and Slovakia remain around 70–80% dependent on Russian gas, mainly through the TurkStream pipeline (ACER, Euronews). Slovakia's dominant supplier SPP presents diversification as a security tool, not as a cheaper option (SPP). That matters. Alternative routes give governments bargaining power and an emergency fall-back. They do not yet guarantee lower bills.

Optionality, Not Independence

Russian gas still covers about 12% of EU demand. ACER's July monitoring found Russian pipeline imports in early 2026 up 7%, while LNG shipments were up 11% compared with the previous period (MondoVisione, ACER). Dependency has been reduced, not removed. The European Commission's Gas Coordination Group reported no immediate security-of-supply concerns (European Commission), which also lowers the pressure to use every available corridor at once.

DESFA's auction shows that south-eastern Europe is buying the infrastructure rights needed to loosen Russia's grip. Traders do not reserve capacity for four years unless they believe the route has commercial value. But diversification is not the same as independence. The proof will be in the physical flow data from ENTSOG: booked capacity turning into actual deliveries north through Romania and Hungary, and a cost comparison showing that the route can compete with legacy Russian supply on price, not only on security.