Trump’s 20% Hormuz Cargo Fee

On 6 July, around 45 large vessels crossed the Strait of Hormuz. By 10 July, ship-tracking firms counted five (Straits Times). No government formally closed the waterway, which carries almost 20% of the world's oil and about a fifth of global LNG trade (EIA). The closure happened commercially, one voyage at a time, as insurers, charterers and shipowners decided that the risk no longer matched the price.

For Malta, this is not a distant maritime story. An island that imports almost everything feels shipping risk quickly: in fuel deliveries, supermarket costs, airline bills and the logistics margins that already sit behind every container unloaded at the Freeport.

Trump then turned a shipping-risk crisis into a legal fight over who controls passage. On 13 July, he declared the United States "Guardian of the Hormuz Strait" and proposed collecting 20% of all cargo value shipped through it (gCaptain). There is no verified mechanism to collect such a fee. The IMO, the UN body that governs shipping, said the same day that compulsory transit fees in an international strait have no legal basis. Oman, which shares the waterway with Iran, told the IMO Council that transit passage is protected under international law (Maritime Executive). The fee proposal may not stand up in maritime law, but the market has already moved.

The Cost Chain

War-risk premiums for Gulf voyages climbed towards 3% of vessel value, up from 2% days earlier, with some underwriters advising owners to suspend transits altogether (Claims Journal). Italian shipping analysts put VLCC premiums — for very large crude carriers — at roughly 4% of vessel value for a single week, or between $250,000 and $375,000 per passage (TrasportoEuropa).

That cost does not stay with the insurer. It moves to the shipowner, then to the charterer, then to the cargo owner. After that it reaches the petrol station, the airport fuel truck, the supermarket loading bay and, eventually, the household budget. In Malta's case, the chain is shorter and more visible because there is no hinterland to absorb the shock. If shipping gets more expensive, the island notices.

The sharper pressure is coming through refined products, not crude. BNP Paribas estimates that Asia and the Middle East supplied 23% of European diesel imports and 90% of jet-fuel imports in 2025 (BNP Paribas). International diesel quotations rose by nearly 10 cents per litre, while petrol moved by only four (Quattroruote).

Diesel matters because it is the fuel of work. It moves trucks, farms and delivery fleets. It carries inflation into the price of goods before the official statistics catch up.

Three Governments, One Bind

The same shock is now appearing across European fuel markets, and every government faces the same choice. It can absorb part of the increase through tax relief, using fiscal room that may already be tight. Or it can let the full price reach consumers and take the political hit.

Portugal chose to cushion the blow. Lisbon expected diesel to rise by seven cents per litre in the week from 13 July and increased fuel-tax support through its ISP discount mechanism (Observador, ECO). Ireland allowed the price to pass through: fuel retailers expected diesel to rise by about 10 cents per litre on higher wholesale costs, while stressing that supply remained adequate (RTÉ).

Hungary has the additional problem of currency weakness. Diesel stood at 608 forint per litre, and a weaker forint against the dollar turns every dollar-priced barrel into a larger domestic cost (Portfolio, Holtankoljak).

The Missing Evidence

The European Commission's energy security task force said on 13 July that it saw no immediate winter supply problem (European Commission). Most crude moving through Hormuz goes to Asia, not Europe, and Gulf exporters have some alternative pipelines and ports (LSEG). The calm may be justified.

What is missing is the public accounting. During this crisis, no EU member state has published a verifiable breakdown of reserve days, dependence on Hormuz-linked diesel and jet fuel, or the insurance surcharge data needed to test official reassurance against actual numbers. That matters for Malta as much as for larger states, because a small island economy cannot treat fuel, freight and aviation costs as abstractions.

National energy ministries and fuel-market regulators owe the public that detail. The people who decide whether Hormuz is commercially usable are not waiting for diplomacy: insurers are repricing war-risk cover, charterers are pausing voyages, and banks are checking sanctions exposure. They are pricing the danger now. European drivers, truckers and airlines are already paying a bill whose real size is still being set by the market.