Turkey Pushes For EU Defence Cash

EU foreign-policy chief Kaja Kallas and senior officials handling enlargement and migration were in Ankara on 30 June for talks with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on trade, migration, visas and security. In the same week, UN envoy María Ángela Holguín pushed back her Brussels meeting on Cyprus until after the NATO summit.

The timing matters. Turkey is using its renewed participation in Cyprus settlement diplomacy to press on several EU files at once. The question inside the Union is how much space Ankara should be given, and which member states are prepared to stop it.

Ankara's shopping list

Turkey has put several demands into the same basket. Diplomatic sources said Fidan pressed for the lifting of the EU's 2019 restrictive measures, the sanctions linked to Turkey's disputed offshore drilling near Cyprus; a formal EU-Turkey Partnership Council; talks on upgrading the customs union; and visa liberalisation (Hurriyet Daily News). The official joint statement confirmed discussions on customs-union modernisation, the visa-liberalisation dialogue, border management, energy and new high-level talks before the end of the year (MFA Türkiye).

President Erdoğan then added the demand that carries the heaviest political charge: Turkey's inclusion in European defence initiatives, including SAFE, the EU's new €150 billion defence-spending instrument (Marine & Océans/AFP, Council). For Malta, the defence angle is not abstract. A neutral member state still sits in Council when EU defence money is designed, and SAFE is precisely the kind of instrument that tests how far the Union can build a defence market without becoming a single defence actor.

Access to EU-backed defence finance is the most sensitive part of Ankara's list. It would direct European money towards the defence industry of a country outside the Union. It would also require unanimity in Council, which means any one EU government can block it.

Each item has its own lock. Customs-union modernisation needs a Council negotiating mandate; the Commission proposed one in 2016 and the Council has never adopted it (EU trade policy). Visa-free travel depends on Turkey meeting conditions set years ago (Commission). Technical talks on migration or trade can restart with far less political friction.

Who can block what

Cyprus and Greece want every EU-Turkey file tied to movement on Cyprus. Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides and European Council President António Costa agreed that EU-Turkey relations cannot move separately from the Cyprus question (Cyprus Mail). Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Tasos Chatzivasileiou set out the harder line: no EU defence funding for a country that maintains a casus belli, a standing threat of war over Greek territorial waters, against an EU member and occupies part of its territory (Proto Thema). Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis stressed "absolute coordination" between Athens and Nicosia (Newsit).

Their leverage is real, but it is not equal across all files. On the customs union and defence access, Athens and Nicosia can stop decisions in Council. On visa processing, trade dialogue and migration cooperation, they cannot close every channel.

That is where other capitals matter. Kallas described Turkey as "a key partner on security, migration and energy" before travelling to Ankara (Euronews). Italy's Giorgia Meloni discussed migration and Libya with Erdoğan ahead of NATO, with Italian reporting suggesting Rome prefers flexible arrangements to fixed Cyprus-linked deadlines (Il Tempo). Bulgaria, whose border with Turkey became a full Schengen external land frontier in January 2025, needs Ankara's cooperation on migration and transit (Council).

These governments are not endorsing Ankara's position on Cyprus. They are making a narrower calculation. Turkey sits across migration routes, energy corridors and transport links that several EU capitals need to keep open, so they resist turning every EU-Turkey file into a hostage of the Cyprus talks.

Malta knows this logic well. Small Mediterranean states often discover that EU principles and regional necessity do not move at the same speed. The test is whether the mechanism protects the smaller member state when larger capitals want a deal.

Before the UN meeting

A proposed summer meeting under UN auspices would bring the two Cypriot leaders together with Greece, Turkey and the UK to see whether formal negotiations can restart. The last attempt, at Crans-Montana in 2017, collapsed (UN report S/2017/814, Cyprus Mail). The core divide remains where it was. Greek Cypriots insist on a bizonal, bicommunal federation. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side are pushing for sovereign equality or a two-state framework. Holguín's postponed Brussels meeting, expected in mid-July, is meant to prepare the ground.

The European Council, where heads of state and government set the EU's direction, says EU-Turkey relations should advance in a "gradual, proportionate and reversible" way, with progress on Cyprus kept in the frame (European Council). That formula was written to keep both camps inside the same paragraph.

So far, the EU has managed to keep Cyprus in the language. The harder part is enforcement. Only some parts of the EU-Turkey relationship can be blocked cleanly, and Ankara is concentrating on the parts that cannot.