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EU_PUBLIC_AFFAIRS11 / 18 · story of the day3 min · 678 words · 37 sources

Two Names Hold Up EU Sanctions

Written by AIto brief AI · 10 ta’ Lulju 2026, 02:50
How it was written

National reservations transform the heavy weight of EU law into something porous and fragile.

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the text · 3 min read

On 3 July, Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev told parliament he would block the EU's 21st sanctions package against Russia unless two names were removed from the blacklist: Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill and Vagit Alekperov, the businessman linked to Lukoil's Bulgarian refinery. Radev framed it as an energy security issue, warning of disruption at the Burgas plant (BTA, European Pravda). Two names among hundreds. Under EU rules, that was enough to hold up the whole file.

Foreign-policy sanctions in the EU still require unanimity under the Treaty on European Union. All 27 governments must agree before a package can pass (Council sanctions overview). The targeted people and companies are listed in annexes attached to the legal text. A government does not need to reject the whole package. It can object to one name, and unanimity turns that objection into a veto.

How Sofia Held the File

By 9 July, Sofia had softened the language. Defence Minister Dimitar Stoyanov went on Bulgarian television to say: "This is not a veto. These are reservations that we propose so that these individuals are removed from the sanctions regime" (Fakti). The demand had not changed. Bulgaria still wanted Kirill and Alekperov taken off the list. What changed was the presentation.

The likely outcome is that the package passes without either name. According to Pravda, diplomats expect the two to be quietly removed. Italy backed Bulgaria on Kirill, reportedly because the Vatican is uneasy about sanctioning the head of a Christian denomination (Euromaidan Press).

A Tactic Other Capitals Recognise

Slovakia's Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár called his Bulgarian counterpart and publicly endorsed Sofia's approach, saying the new government was "asserting its interests similarly to Slovakia" (Teraz). Hungarian media read the episode through Budapest's own record of using veto threats to extract concessions on EU funds and foreign policy (hir36).

There is no evidence of coordination between Sofia, Budapest and Bratislava. But Hungary has made the method familiar: use unanimity to force movement in Brussels, then tell voters at home that national interests were defended. Slovakia now treats Bulgaria's move as normal Council hard bargaining, not obstruction (ta3).

Where the Package Bent

Bulgaria's fight over names was only one part of the negotiation. By the time ambassadors reached COREPER, the committee where national representatives settle files before ministers formally decide, the sanctions package had become a bundle of bargains (Capital.gr, Kyiv Independent).

Greece, Cyprus and Malta pushed to shorten a freeze on Russia's oil price cap from six months to three or four. The cap allows Western shipping, insurance and financing services to handle Russian crude only if it is sold below a set ceiling. The mechanism is meant to reduce Moscow's revenue without causing a shock in global supply (in.gr). A shorter freeze matters because it could allow the cap to rise sooner, sending more oil money to Moscow (Pravda).

For Malta, this is not an abstract sanctions clause. The island's maritime sector is directly exposed to rules on shipping, insurance and finance. Like Greece and Cyprus, Malta has commercial skin in the argument, and that makes the final shape of the cap a domestic economic question as much as a foreign-policy one.

On another track, France and Italy forced the EU to narrow a proposed entry ban on Russian military veterans (Euronews). Disputes over Russian fish import quotas added another point of friction.

Each carve-out teaches every capital the same lesson: sensitive names, sectors and industries can be protected in the final stretch if a government is willing to slow the file. The 21st package will probably pass. Its content, however, will show which governments had the strongest domestic reasons to bargain it down, not necessarily a shared assessment of what pressure on Moscow would work best.

The sanctions regime can live with some of this. It cannot function indefinitely if the least willing capitals keep setting the final terms. The European Council, where EU leaders set the bloc's political direction, could reopen the unanimity rule for sanctions. No leader has proposed doing so.

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