US cuts NATO bomber pledges

The US military is reducing its European commitments faster than many allies had expected. The sharpest cuts sit outside the one legal guardrail Congress put in place to slow a withdrawal: strategic bombers halved, fighters cut by a third, submarines reduced to zero.

For Malta, which is not in NATO but lives inside the EU security debate, this matters. A weaker American backstop pushes European governments into defence choices that will shape EU budgets, industrial policy and Mediterranean security for years.

Two Channels, One Unguarded

There are two American military presences in Europe. One is physical: roughly 80,000 US troops stationed on the continent today. Congress set a floor of 76,000 in Section 1249 of the NDAA, the annual US defence authorisation bill. If the Pentagon wants to go below that, it must certify to lawmakers that allied security will not be harmed.

The more sensitive channel is NATO’s Force Model. This is the crisis-planning system where allies list what they would send in an emergency: forces ready to move from home bases within 10, 30 or 180 days. These pledges are decided by the executive branch. There is no statute forcing Washington to maintain them.

That is where the cuts are landing. When Pentagon envoy Alexander Velez-Green briefed NATO officials on 22 May, he presented reductions in this category: bombers halved, a third fewer fighters, zero submarines, reduced tankers and destroyers (CDE News). The Pentagon confirmed the figures but gave no timelines.

On 30 May, Welt am Sonntag reported that the drawdown would move faster than previously communicated, without the transition period European governments had assumed. A NATO diplomat told Reuters the pace "will depend on the capacity of the others to come in with alternatives," adding that "everything is not yet definitely decided, even in the U.S."

A Gap That Money Alone Cannot Close

Europe can spend more, but it cannot buy time. The IISS estimated in 2025 that replacing US conventional capabilities in the Euro-Atlantic theatre would cost $226–344 billion in platforms alone, approaching $1 trillion over 25 years. The Kiel Institute’s May 2026 assessment puts meaningful, not full, autonomy at roughly €50 billion annually for a decade.

The aircraft gap shows the problem clearly. Europe would need 350–400 additional combat aircraft to cover the fighter shortfall alone. European factories cannot deliver that before the mid-2030s.

Capitals are responding in different ways. France is extending its nuclear umbrella through what it calls "dissuasion avancée", or forward deterrence. Partner countries shelter under France’s nuclear guarantee, but Paris keeps full control over any launch decision. On 27 May, Norway became the ninth country to join through the Narvik Arrangement.

On the conventional side, Germany and the Netherlands are assuming command responsibility for the defence of Estonia and Latvia through their joint 1st German-Netherlands Corps. That is a direct transfer of Baltic defence leadership from Washington to European hands.

The 2027–2029 Window

Both tracks expose the same weakness: timing. Poland’s chief of general staff confirmed work on indigenous deep-strike weapons but acknowledged "at least two years" before first results. The EU Institute for Security Studies warns that the cancelled Tomahawk deployment to Germany "removes a key component of Europe’s deterrence" during what it calls "years of military transition."

The Carnegie Endowment notes that Baltic states fear the withdrawal will come "before Europe manages to fill its defense gaps". That fear is not theoretical. It is the period between an American reduction that can happen by executive decision and a European replacement that depends on budgets, factories and command structures still being built.

Every assessment points to the same vulnerable window: 2027 to 2029. That is when US reductions bite hardest and European replacements remain years from delivery.

The next test comes in early June at NATO’s Force Sourcing Conference, where European nations must say which American gaps they intend to fill. Washington has created a sequence that leaves allies with a hard choice: commit publicly to closing gaps they cannot yet close, or arrive at the Ankara Summit in July with no credible answer.