Wang Yi reopens Sweden channel

For the first time in 22 years, a Chinese foreign minister has set foot in Sweden. Wang Yi was in Stockholm on 4 July as part of a Nordic tour taking in Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway between 2 and 8 July (GP, Politiken). The visit was not ceremonial. Beijing is testing whether direct diplomacy, backed by the weight of trade and investment, can soften some of Europe's most sceptical governments.

The timing explains the method. EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič has pointed to October as the moment when Brussels expects "tangible results" from Beijing on trade disputes (Euronews, SCMP). Wang's Nordic tour is Beijing's move before that checkpoint.

Why visit Stockholm when Brussels sets trade policy?

Sweden cannot cut a private trade deal with China on issues already handled by the EU. Trade policy is an EU competence, meaning tariffs and anti-subsidy measures are decided through the bloc's institutions, not by individual capitals (TFEU Article 207). The EU has already imposed duties on Chinese electric vehicles through binding regulation (Implementing Regulation 2024/2754).

Foreign and security policy runs on a different track. Sanctions and diplomatic positions require unanimity in the Council, where national governments sit around the table. That gives every capital, including the smallest ones, leverage. Malta knows this logic well: a member state may not own the trade instrument, but it can influence the political temperature around its use.

That is why Stockholm matters. Sweden cannot rewrite EU trade law for Beijing. It can help shape whether Brussels feels backed, isolated, or overextended when it uses tariffs and investigations against subsidised imports. For China, bilateral diplomacy is a way of working around the Brussels machine without formally bypassing it.

The Nordic governments kept the same public line

The hosts received Wang politely, but they did not shift their public position. Denmark's foreign minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, set out two concerns before the meeting: China's support for Russia's war in Ukraine and the imbalance in EU-China trade. He said Wang should hear the same message in every Nordic capital (Politiken). Finland took a similar line, putting EU-China relations, Russia's war and European security at the centre of the talks (Yle).

Sweden's tone was sharper. Foreign Minister Maria Malmer Stenergard raised Ukraine and trade, and stressed EU unity. Swedish commentary also kept Gui Minhai in view: the Swedish citizen and publisher imprisoned in China, whose case remains unresolved. Expressen columnist Jojje Olsson argued that reopening channels with Beijing risks pushing detained citizens to the margins once summitry and market access take over (Expressen).

That is the real test for Stockholm. It is easy to speak about values when relations are frozen. It is harder when ministers are back in the room and economic files are on the table.

China has better openings elsewhere

The Nordic line held. Beijing's stronger openings are further south and east.

Germany is the key swing state. Chinese competition hits the core of its industrial model: cars, machinery and chemicals. German media have described the pressure as a "China shock" (Handelsblatt). Berlin increasingly supports EU tariffs, but it also wants dialogue, because a full trade conflict would hurt German industry as well as Chinese exporters (ZDFheute). According to German reporting, Beijing's message to Berlin is that Germany should play an "active role" in steering Brussels towards a more "rational" position (ZEIT).

Hungary offers another route. Budapest has built part of its industrial strategy around Chinese capital. BYD's first European passenger-car factory and CATL's battery plant in Debrecen are not side projects; they are strategic pillars (HIPA). Hungary cannot rewrite EU trade law, but its veto in foreign-policy decisions gives it blocking power over Council positions on China.

Lithuania shows the other side of the bargain. After Vilnius allowed a Taiwanese representative office in 2021, Beijing downgraded relations and applied economic pressure, pushing the European Commission to take China to the WTO (LRT). For small EU states, including Malta, the lesson is uncomfortable but familiar: once pressure is rewarded bilaterally, the common European position becomes easier to pick apart.

The October test

By October, Brussels wants to know whether Beijing will move on overcapacity and market access. If it does not, the EU is likely to keep expanding its use of tariffs, steel quotas and customs enforcement (AP, Internazionale/Reuters).

Wang Yi's Nordic tour did not break Europe's front. Beijing does not need a clean break. It needs enough hesitation in enough capitals to make the hardest tools politically costly. Brussels holds the trade instruments. Germany, Hungary and the rest decide how difficult it becomes to use them.